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Abstract
Following Ben-Porath (1967), the inuence of life expectancy on ed-
ucation has attracted much attention. Whereas existing growth models
rely on an education decision made either by the child or by his parent, we
revisit the Ben-Porath e¤ect when the education is the outcome of a bar-
gaining between the parent and the child. We develop a three-period OLG
model with human capital accumulation and endogenous life expectancy,
and show that, as a result of the unequal life horizons faced by parents and
children, the Ben-Porath e¤ect depends on the distribution of bargaining
power within the family, which in turn a¤ects the long-run dynamics of
the economy. Using data on 17 OECD countries (1940-1980), we show
that the introduction of intergenerational bargaining on education helps
to rationalize the observed education patterns across countries.
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1 Introduction
Following the pioneer works by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990), human capi-
tal accumulation is now regarded as a major factor of growth. As it is widely
acknowledged, the human capital accumulation process is strongly related to
demographic trends, concerning both mortality and fertility (Ehrlich and Lui
1991, Boucekkine et al 2002). On the mortality side, a major link was empha-
sized by Ben Porath (1967). The so-called Ben Porath e¤ect states that, when
life expectancy increases, lifetime returns on education investment tend, under
general conditions, to increase, leading to a rise in the optimal education.
In accordance with the Ben-Porath hypothesis, we observe, for most coun-
tries, a positive correlation between life expectancy and education. To illustrate
this, Figure 1 presents period life expectancies at birth and average years of ed-
ucation per cohort from Cohen and Leker (2012) for 5 countries over 1940-1980.
The correlation between the two variables is positive for all countries.1
Figure 1: Years of education and period life expectancy at birth
Note that, although the Ben-Porath mechanism is a simple way to rationalize
the observed patterns, alternative explanations exist. For instance, the positive
correlation between education and life expectancy may result from the reverse
causal chain: better education can trigger higher longevity.2 There may also be
a third, omitted variable, determining jointly education and health outcomes.
But even if one abstracts from those identication problems, the observed
relationship between education and longevity is far from trivial. Indeed, Figure
1 Indeed, the Ben-Porath e¤ect supposes that individuals make schooling decisions while
anticipating their life horizon, which is better proxied by period life expectancy than cohort
life expectancy.
2This is taken into account in models with endogenous mortality, such as Cervelatti and
Sunde (2005) and de la Croix and Licandro (2012).
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1 displays increasing but alternatively linear, concave and convex relationships.3
All this explains why the Ben-Porath e¤ect, although widely used by growth the-
orists, nds mitigated empirical support, and as such, invites some renements
on the theoretical side.4
We propose here to revisit the Ben-Porath e¤ect, by making alternative
assumptions on the education decision. Existing models presuppose that the
education decision is made by a single agent (the parent or the child), whereas
the family is a collective decision unit, and education is not the outcome of a
single, individual decision. An abundant literature has pointed out the impact
of family bargaining on various outcomes, such as time allocation and education
in Konrad and Lommerud (2000), or education and fertility in de la Croix and
Vander Donkt (2010). Following these works, we propose to construct a model
where education results from an intrafamily bargaining, and we examine the
e¤ect of bargaining power distribution on the Ben-Porath e¤ect.
In this paper, we develop a three-period OLG model where human capital
accumulation results from an education investment decided through a bargain-
ing process between parents and children.5 In this framework, agents educate
themselves to benet from higher wages in the future, while parents enjoy co-
existence with educated children. We rst characterize the optimal education
from the point of view, respectively, of the child and of his parent, and, then,
derive the education resulting from intrafamily bargaining. We show how the
education varies with the distribution of bargaining power. Then, we analyze
the long-run dynamics, when mortality is also endogenized, in order to take into
account the double causal link between longevity and human capital.6
Our model shares with Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and de la Croix and
Licandro (2012) the rening of the Ben-Porath mechanism by endogenizing
mortality, which allows a positive feedback loop between human capital and
increasing longevity. But these models are based on the simple Ben-Porath
mechanism, that is to say that individuals decide alone on their own education,
contrary to our model that introduces the parents preferences in the education
decision. Our model shares with Ehrlich and Lui (1991) the time-horizon e¤ect
of parentslongevity on childrens education, in the context of egoistic parents
decisions for childrens education. But contrary to us, Ehrlich and Lui (1991)
consider that the education decision is made only by the parent. Finally, Soares
(2005) takes into account both the parents and the childs decisions with re-
3While in many models the Ben-Porath e¤ect translates into a concave relation between
education and longevity, Cohen and Soto (2004) show that mincerian returns to education
imply a convex relation. The patterns in Figure 1 are neither fully concave, nor fully convex.
4See Cohen and Soto (2004, 2007), Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Lorentzen et al (2008),
and Cohen and Leker (2012) for a discussion at the empirical level.
5 In our model, education is time consuming. The education investment takes the form of
a fraction of time that the parent and the child must spend together. This specication is
general: one can think of a father watching his child, but also of a professor teaching to a
student, or of a senior worker helping a junior worker.
6For simplicity, we assume here a xed fertility, equal to the replacement level. On the
determinants of education under endogenous fertility, see Barro and Becker (1989), Erlich and
Lui (1991), Soares (2005) and de la Croix and Licandro (2012).
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spect to human capital investment by distinguishing early education, which is
within the parents province, and high education, which is within the childs.
But we di¤er from his approach by considering education as a collective decision,
resulting from an intrafamily bargaining.
Anticipating on our results, we show that the di¤erences in the (remaining)
time horizons between the parent and the child imply a disagreement on the ed-
ucation investment. The child, who faces a longer time horizon, always wants,
in the absence of myopia about future returns from education, more education
than what his parent is willing to invest. Hence, under rational children, the
higher the parents bargaining power is, the lower the education investment is,
whereas that result may be inverted when the child is myopic about future ed-
ucation returns. In a second stage, we study the e¤ects of the distribution of
power in the family on long-run dynamics, and show that economies with high
parental bargaining power are more likely to be trapped in poverty. We also
consider an extended model, where the distribution of bargaining power depends
on human capital accumulation, and consider two cases: children emancipation
thanks to human capital accumulation, or parental authority reinforced. We
show how the relation between knowledge and power a¤ects the long-run dy-
namics of the economy. Finally, we propose an empirical application of the
model on 17 OECD countries (1940-1980), and show how the introduction of
family bargaining helps to rationalize the various observed patterns of education
and life expectancy across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model, and studies the education decision as the outcome of an intrafamily bar-
gaining. Section 3 examines the long-run dynamics of the economy. Section 4
endogenizes the distribution of bargaining power. Section 5 proposes an empiri-
cal illustration, and examines how the introduction of an intrafamily bargaining
can help to rationalize the patterns of education and life expectancies in 17
OECD countries (1940-1980). Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a three-period OLG model. All periods are of unitary length.
Each cohort is a continuum of agents, with a measure normalized to 1. There
is an implicit period of childhood not presented in the model, so that the rst
period is a period of young adulthood. Reproduction is monosexual, and indi-
viduals give birth to one child at the beginning of the rst period.
All agents live the rst period of life (young adulthood). This consists of a
period during which individuals divide their time between work and education
for themselves, with the help of the preceding generation.7
All agents live the second period of life (old adulthood). This is a period
during which individuals work, consume, and devote time to educate their child.
7For simplicity, we assume that there is no saving decision.
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However, not all agents will reach the third period: only a proportion t+2 of
a cohort of young adults at t will enjoy the third period of life. During this third
period, agents work, consume, and enjoy the companionship of their - more or
less educated - children.8
The survival probability to the third period t+2 is increasing in the human
capital agents enjoyed when being educated adults (second period).9 The prob-
ability of survival to the third period of life of a person who is young adult at
t, denoted t+2, depends on the stock of human capital ht+1 by means of the
survival function:
t+2  (ht+1) (1)
where (ht) exhibits the following properties: (:) > 0; 0(:) > 0 and 00(:) < 0:
We also assume that (ht) is bounded from below and from above: limh!0 (h) =
~, 0 < ~ < 1 and limh!1 (h) = , 0 < ~ <  < 1.
2.2 Production and human capital accumulation
For simplicity, production is assumed to be linear in human capital:
yt = wht (2)
where yt denotes the output, w is the wage per unit of human capital, and ht is
the stock of human capital. For the sake of the presentation, we will normalize
w to 1:
The human capital of an individual who is a young adult at time t equals
ht, i.e. the human capital inherited from his parent. Then, at old adulthood,
he enjoys a human capital level ht+1, which depends on past human capital ht,
and on the time investment in education et. The actual returns on education
investment take the following form:
ht+1 = h(et) = Ahtet (3)
where et is a temporal education investment, and A a productivity parameter
(A > 0).
The actual perception of the future returns from education may not be fully
perfect, as some myopia may occur. To capture this, we assume that the child,
when young adult, chooses his education investment on the basis of the following,
perceived returns: eh(et) = Ahtet (4)
where  reects the degree of rationality of the individual when young adult
(0    1). Note that in the particular case when  = 1, there is no myopia of
the child. We assume, without loss of generality, that old adults, when thinking
about the education of their children, perfectly anticipate the actual returns on
education h(et+1):
8Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves here to a model with only two
possible lengths of life. See Ponthiere (2011) for a study of asymptotic age structures in an
OLG model with endogenous fertility.
9Many studies show that the level of human capital has an important impact on longevity,
through knowledge on prevention and treatments of diseases. See Easterlin (1999).
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2.3 Education decision
Whereas existing models assume that either the child or the parent chooses the
education investment, we assume in this model that both the parent and the
child take part in the education decision. For simplicity, we assume that the
education investment has a temporal form, and involves both the parent and the
child: they must spend together a fraction of their life period to improve the
childs human capital.10 The expected lifetime welfare of a young adult agent
at time t takes the following form:
EUt = log(ct) + log(ct+1) + t+2 log(ct+2) + t+2 log(et+1) (5)
where ct is consumption at time t,  captures the parental taste for his childs
education (0 <  < 1), and et+1 is the education investment of the agents
child. Note that there is no reason why the parent and the child would like
to choose the same education investment, since the parental valuation of the
childs education lies in the companionship with an educated child, while, for
the child himself, the value of education comes from the higher wage he will get
in return.
A parent young adult at t and a child young adult at t + 1 will reach an
agreement on the time to devote to the childs education thanks to a bargaining
at the beginning of the t+ 1 period. Hence, formally, the education investment
is assumed to be the outcome of a bargaining, with a bargaining power " to the
parent, and 1   " to the child. Thus the education investment resulting from
the bargaining is the solution of the following maximization problem:
max
et+1
"EUt + (1  ")EUt+1
where EUt is the expected lifetime welfare of the parent, who was a young adult
at t, and EUt+1 the expected lifetime welfare of the child, who will become young
adult at t+ 1:
2.3.1 The disagreement between parents and children
Before considering the intrafamily bargaining problem, we will rst explain why
and to what extent the parent and the child disagree about the fraction of time
to devote to education. We will therefore look at what the parent would have
chosen to invest in his childs education if he was the only one to decide. Then,
in a second stage, we will look at what the child would have chosen to invest in
his own education if he could decide alone.
10This is equivalent to a denition of education as a monetary investment equally shared
by the parent and the child.
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The parents optimum The young parent at tmaximizes his expected utility
over his childs education et+1:11
max
et+1
log(ht(1  et)) + log(eh(et)(1  et+1))
+Et+1(t+2) log(eh(et)) + Et+1(t+2) log(h(et+1))
Assuming that the parent has perfect foresight, i.e. Et+1 (t+2) = t+2, the
maximization of his expected utility over his childs education becomes:
max
et+1
log(ht(1  et)) + log(eh(et)(1  et+1))
+t+2 log(eh(et)) + t+2 log(h(et+1))
The rst-order condition yields:
h0(et+1)
h(et+1)
=
1
t+2
 
1  et+1

where et+1 is the optimal education for the parent. As h(et+1) = Aht+1et+1,
we have:
et+1 =
t+2
1 + t+2
(6)
Hence:
@et+1
@t+2
=

(1 + t+2)2
> 0
@2et+1
@2t+2
=
 22
(1 + t+2)3
< 0
There is a positive time horizon e¤ect. The higher the life expectancy of the
parent is, the higher the education investment in his child is ceteris paribus.
This educational investment depends also positively on the parents taste for
childs education:
@et+1
@
=
t+2
(1 + t+2)2
> 0
Moreover, as limt!+1 t =  < 1 and as 0 <  < 1, we have:
0 < et+1 <

1 + 
<
1
2
The childs optimum The young adult at t+1maximizes his expected utility
over his own education et+1:
maxet+1 log(ht+1(1  et+1)) + log(eh(et+1)(1  et+2))
+Et+1(t+3) log(eh(et+1)) + Et+1(t+3) log(h(et+2))
11We suppose that his expected utility over his childs education depends on his expected
survival probability in t+ 1; since the childs education does not intervene in the rst period.
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Assuming that the child fails to perfectly anticipate his life time horizon, i.e.
Et+1(t+3) = t+2, his problem becomes:
max
et+1
log(ht+1(1  et+1)) + log(eh(et+1)(1  et+2))
+t+2 log(eh(et+1)) + t+2 log(h(et+2))
Note that the childs expected utility di¤ers from the parents forwarded by one
period, since the child does not perfectly anticipate his longevity.12 The FOC
yields: eh0(et+1)eh(et+1) = 1 1  et+1 (1 + t+2)
where et+1 is the optimal time investment for the child in his own education.
As eh(et+1) = Aht+1et+1; we have:
et+1 =
 (1 + t+2)
1 + (1 + t+2)
(7)
with:
@et+1
@t+2
=

[1 + (1 + t+2)]
2 > 0
@2et+1
@2t+2
=   2
[1 + (1 + t+2)]
3 < 0
There is a positive time horizon e¤ect. This is the Ben-Porath mechanism.
Moreover, as limt!+1 t =  < 1 and as (:) > 0:
0 <

1 + 
< et+1 <
 (1 + )
1 + (1 + )
<
2
3
Finally,
@et+1
@
=
1 + t+2
[1 + (1 + t+2)]
2 > 0
Myopia has a negative e¤ect on the education chosen by the child.
The disagreement between the parent and the child It follows from all
this that there is no reason why the parent and the child would agree about the
education investment to be engaged on the child.
If  < 
h
1+t+2
t+2
i
, then the child wants more education than the parent. If
on the contrary  > 

1+


, the child wants less education than the parent.
12Given that the parent and his child bargain and discuss about the future, it makes sense to
assume that they share the same beliefs on longevity prospects. In particular, it is plausible to
suppose that the parent, thanks to his older age, is better informed about the survival process
(explaining that his foresight is perfect), and shares that information with his child.
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In the special case when there is no myopia ( = 1), the parent always wants
a lower investment in his childs education than the child himself:
t+2
1 + t+2
<
1 + t+2
2 + t+2
, et+1 < et+1
The following proposition sums up our results.
Proposition 1  The child wants more education than the parent wants for
him if  < 
h
1+t+2
t+2
i
 The parents and the childs optimum display a positive time horizon e¤ect:
@e
@t+2
> 0 and
@e
@t+2
> 0
 As 8t; ~ < t+2 <  and 0 <  < 1, e and e are bounded:
0 < e <
1
2
and 0 < e <
2
3
The parents upper bound is lower than the childs upper bound.
Proof. See the comparison of FOCs for the child and the parents choices of
optimal e and e.
The origin of the disagreement between the parent and the child lies in two
di¤erences: the myopia of the child and the di¤erence between their expected
life horizons. The parent benets from his childs education during one period
only and with a probability t+2, while the child benets from his own education
potentially during two periods. Hence the disagreement comes from the failure
of the child to anticipate his returns on education investment and from the
heterogeneity in terms of age.
2.3.2 Family bargaining
The parent and the child must agree on a time period e to devote to the
childs education, since the child cannot educate himself without his parents
e¤ort. Let us now solve the family bargaining problem, by substituting for the
utility functions of the parent and the child in the bargaining function:
max
et+1
"EUt + (1  ")EUt+1
The optimal childs education is:
et+1 =
"t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)
1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2) (8)
" inuences negatively the childs education when the child wants more ed-
ucation than the parent:
@e
@"
=
t+2   (1 + t+2)
[1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)]2
7 0()  7 

1 + t+2
t+2

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Myopia 1   inuences negatively the childs education:
@e
@
=
(1  ")(1 + t+2)
[1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)]2
> 0
As both the parents and the childs optimal investment in education are
subject to a time horizon e¤ect, the fraction of time e resulting from the
bargaining is also subject to a time-horizon e¤ect:
@e
@t+2
=
" + (1  ")
[1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)]2
> 0
@2e
@2t+2
=   2 [" + (1  ")]
2
[1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)]3
< 0
The investment in human capital is increasing in the survival probability. Yet,
it does not result from a pure Ben-Porath e¤ect, nor from a pure time-horizon
e¤ect for the parent due to the companionship of his child, but from a combi-
nation of these two e¤ects. Whether this time-horizon e¤ect is higher or lower
than the childs time horizon e¤ect or the parents time horizon e¤ect remains
ambiguous:
@e2
@t+2  @" =
 "2t+2+(1 ")(1 t+2) 
+"t+2(2+t+2)+2(1 ")(1+t+2)
[1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)]3
? 0
Proposition 2 The education investment determined by the intrafamily bar-
gaining is:
et+1 =
"t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)
1 + "t+2 + (1  ")(1 + t+2)
with:
@e
@"
? 0; @e

@t+2
> 0; and
@e
@
> 0:
Proof. See supra the FOC of the family bargaining and the derivative of the
familys optimum with respect to t+2 and ":
This section showed that the di¤erences in age - and thus time horizon -
between the parent and the child can lead to a disagreement on the childs
education, and introduced a family bargaining process to take into account
both the parents and the childs points of view. The next section explores the
implications of this on long-run economic dynamics.
3 Long-run dynamics
Let us now characterize the long-run dynamics of the economy. Given that the
survival probability t+1 and the output yt are functions of the human capital
stock ht, it follows that education investment et is also a function of ht. Hence
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the constancy of the human capital stock ht over time brings the constancy of
all variables : yt; t+1; and et:
Substituting for the level of education resulting from the family bargaining
in the human capital accumulation equation yields:
ht+1 = A

"(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))

ht  G(ht) (9)
The issue of the existence of a stationary equilibrium amounts to studying
whether the transition function G(ht) admits a xed point, that is, a value ht
such that G(ht) = ht.
Proposition 3 The long-run dynamics of the economy belongs to one of the
three following cases:
 Case 1: if A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

< 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1,
then h = 0 is the unique stationary equilibrium: any economy with h0 > 0
will converge towards h = 0: That equilibrium is stable.
 Case 2: if A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

< 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1,
then there exists two stationary equilibria: h = 0 and h > 0: h is
locally stable, while h is unstable. Any economy with h0 < h will
converge to h = 0 while any economy with h0 > h will exhibit perpetual
growth.
 Case 3: if A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

> 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1,
then h = 0 is the unique stationary equilibrium. That equilibrium is
unstable. Any economy with h0 > 0 will exhibit perpetual growth.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, depending on the productivity parameter A, the parameter of pref-
erence for children , the bounds of the survival probability ~ and ; the degree
of the childs myopia 1   ; and on the distribution of the bargaining power
", an economy may experience three distinct forms of long-run dynamics, il-
lustrated on Figure 2.13 In the rst case, the economy converges towards no
human capital and the lowest life expectancy 2 + ~ whatever the initial human
capital is. In the third case, the economy experiences perpetual growth and
converges towards the highest life expectancy 2+  whatever the initial level of
human capital is. In the second case, depending on the initial human capital,
the economy is either trapped in poverty or experiences perpetual growth.
13Figure 2 shows the transition function G(ht) and the 45 line.
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The 3 cases of long-run dynamics
The importance of the distribution of the intergenerational bargaining power
regarding the likelihood of those cases is summed up in the following corollary,
as well as the importance of the childs myopia 1  :
Corollary 1  The lower " is, the higher the likelihood of perpetual growth
is, ceteris paribus.
 The higher  is, the higher the likelihood of perpetual growth is, 8" 6= 0;
ceteris paribus.
 For the polar case " = 1 and  = 0, the economy is necessarily trapped in
poverty.
 The higher  is, the higher the likelihood of perpetual growth is, 8" 6= 0;
ceteris paribus.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us notice that not only "; but also the productivity parameter A; and the
limits of the survival function ~ and ; play a crucial role with respect to long-
run dynamics. The higher A is, the higher the likelihood of perpetual growth is.
In particular, for A < 1+"+(1 ")(1+)"+(1 ")(1+) perpetual growth is impossible (cases
2 or 3 are impossible). The higher  and ~ are, the lower the likelihood of the
existence of a poverty trap is (cases 1 or 2). For the polar case " = 1 and e = 0,
case 3 is impossible.
Proposition 3 shows that the Ben-Porath mechanism is at the very heart of
the long-run dynamics of the economy. Clearly, whether the economys dynam-
ics falls under one case or another depends crucially on the shape of the survival
function  (), and, in particular, on its limit levels ~ and .
Moreover, the introduction of a collective education investment decision re-
nes the Ben-Porath e¤ect by taking into account unequal time horizon e¤ects
of the parent and the child, which modies the speed of human capital accu-
mulation and therefore the whole transition function. The distribution of the
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bargaining power has a major inuence on long-run dynamics: under rational
children, the higher the parents power is, the higher the possibility of being
trapped in poverty, whereas the opposite holds under myopic children.
4 Endogenous bargaining power
The distribution of bargaining power within families is likely to vary over time.
We examine here the robustness of our analysis to the introduction of a varying
bargaining power distribution. For simplicity, we modelize " as a function of
human capital:
"t  " (ht) (10)
That modelling is quite standard in the literature, which makes intrafamily
bargaining power depend on the human capital level of individuals.14
The precise form of the functional relationship linking bargaining power to
human capital can hardly be known a priori. Two opposite e¤ects are at work.
On the one hand, a child born with a higher human capital is likely to be
more emancipated, thanks to his larger knowledge (prior to education). This
favors a declining parental bargaining power with the human capital of the child,
i.e. "0 (ht) < 0. On the other hand, the human capital ht is also enjoyed by the
parents, and results from their own education decision. Better educated parents
can also use their knowledge to better inuence their child: "0 (ht) > 0.
Given that it is too early, at this stage, to know which e¤ect dominates the
other, we will, in the rest of this section, consider the two cases successively:
rstly, the case in which "0(ht) < 0 (emancipation of the child thanks to a higher
human capital at birth); secondly, the case in which "0(ht) > 0 (reinforcement
of the parental authority through his own education).15
4.1 Childs emancipation ("0(ht) < 0)
In this case, when the human capital increases, the bargaining power of the
child increases:
@"t
@ht
< 0
We will use the following notations: limht!0 "(ht) = " and limht!+1 "(ht) = e".
The intertemporal human capital equation now yields:
ht+1 = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

ht  H(ht) (11)
The issue of the existence of a steady-state equilibrium amounts to studying
whether the transition function H(ht) admits a xed point.
14See, for instance Lam and Schoeni (1993), who show that women with higher education
and income have more bargaining power in their household, which implies higher schooling
for their children.
15The distribution of bargaining power may also vary in a non-monotonic way. Yet, for sim-
plicity, we will only consider a monotonic relation between the distribution of the bargaining
power and human capital.
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Proposition 4 The long-run dynamics belongs to one of the following cases:
 Case 1: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1 and
A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1: There exist an odd number of positive sta-
tionary equilibria. There exist a poverty trap and an area of perpetual
growth.
 Case 2: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1:
There exist an odd number of positive stationary equilibria. There may
exist no stable equilibrium and there is no area of perpetual growth.
 Case 3: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1:
There exist either 0 or an even number of positive stationary equilibria.
There exist a poverty trap and no area of perpetual growth.
 Case 4: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1:
There exist either 0 or an even number of positive stationary equilibria.
There may exist no stable equilibrium and there exists an area of perpetual
growth.
 For every cases, if at some point h the transition function crosses the 45
line from above and jH 0(h)j < 1, then h is a locally stable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the bargaining power of the parent is increasing with human capital,
there may exist poverty traps, or zones of perpetual growth, but also some
positive and locally stable equilibria - as the transition function H(h) is non
monotonous. Therefore, there may exist many pattern di¤erences in the long-
run dynamics across countries: poverty traps, perpetual growth or convergence
towards di¤erent levels of output, human capital and life expectancy.
4.2 Parental authority reinforced ("0(ht) > 0)
In this case, when the human capital increases, the power of the parent increases:
@"t
@ht
> 0
We will use the following notations: limht!0 "(ht) = e" and limht!+1 "(ht) = ".
The human capital accumulation equation still yields:
ht+1 = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

ht  J(ht) (12)
The issue of the existence of a stationary equilibrium amounts to studying
whether the transition function J(ht) admits a xed point.
14
Proposition 5 The long-run dynamics belongs to one of the following cases:
 Case 1: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1 and
A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1: There exist an odd number of positive sta-
tionary equilibria. There exist a poverty trap and an area of perpetual
growth.
 Case 2: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1:
There exist an odd number of positive stationary equilibria. There may
exist no stable equilibrium and there is no area of perpetual growth.
 Case 3: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1:
There exist either 0 or an even number of positive stationary equilibria.
There exist a poverty trap and no area of perpetual growth.
 Case 4: A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1 and A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1:
There exist either 0 or an even number of positive stationary equilibria.
There may exist no stable equilibrium and there exists an area of perpetual
growth.
 For every cases, if at some point h the transition function crosses the 45
line from above and jJ 0(h)j < 1, then h is a locally stable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
In that case, the dynamics of the transition function are similar to the case
of childs emancipation.
In sum, this section emphasized the impact of the distribution of bargaining
power for long-run economic dynamics. The next section proposes to explore,
by means of an empirical application, whether the introduction of family bar-
gaining over education helps to t the data, and evaluates the plausibility of
the hypotheses of emancipation of the child and of reinforcement of parental
authority with the accumulation of human capital.
5 Empirical illustration
In this section, we will rst present some stylized facts on the evolution of
education and longevity in a broad set of countries for cohorts born between
1940 and 1980, and question to what extent our model is compatible with these
data.16 Then, we will propose a qualitative test of our model, which consists
of checking whether the addition of intrafamily bargaining allows us to better
16For that purpose, we will set in that section  = 1 to focus only on the evolution of the
distribution of bargaining power in the family.
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explain the dynamics of life expectancy and education over time, in comparison
with the simple Ben-Porath model.17
The database contains the mean year of education per cohorts born between
1940 and 1980, taken from Cohen and Leker (2012). Our database also includes
period life expectancy at birth for these same cohorts taken from the World
Bank for 17 OECD countries.18 19
5.1 Stylized facts
Our model predicts that education must be an increasing and concave function of
life expectancy. Yet, as emphasized in section 1, while we observe that education
increases with life expectancy, the relationships displayed by Figure 1 are more
complex. Denmark displays a quasi linear relation during all the period, while
the United Kingdom and France display a convex life expectancy / education
relationship until 1960. The introduction of a collective decision within the
family in our model helps to rationalize these relationships, as we will show
below.20
To check whether our model is compatible or not with the data, we have
derived values for key variables of the model,  and e; from life expectancies at
birth and mean years of education, considering that one period of time lasts 25
year. Table 1 displays these data for our panel of 17 OECD countries.
The simple Ben-Porath model and the data In the standard Ben-
Porath model, the individual chooses his own education investment. This cor-
responds to the case in which " = 0 in our model, i.e. when the child has all
the bargaining power. To see how this simple model ts the data or not, we
compute the education investment e^ predicted by the model for actual life
expectancies, and try to see whether this predicted level of education coincides
or not with the actual education investment. In Table 1, we observe that the
predicted level of education for " = 0; e^; is always higher than the actual
education investment, e (the mean of the di¤erence of the two series if 0.16
with a standard deviation of 0.05). The correlation between e and e^ is 0.60.
The fraction of life expectancy that the individual would devote to education
according to the model is much higher than what we observe in the data.
17We are aware that our model is very simple, and that our parameters may capture many
other features than the bargaining power or the preference for childrens education. Nonethe-
less, we consider this empirical section as a rst way to evaluate the potential explanatory
gains arising from adding intrafamily bargaining in a Ben-Porath style model.
18Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
19As the model predicts that both parents and children take their decisions while considering
their expected longevity, period life expectancies are of better interest for our question than
cohort life expectancies.
20There are of course other ways to rationalize such functional forms, an in particular
hypotheses about the production function. See for instance Cohen and Soto (2007) on the
interest of mincerian returs to education.
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Figure 2: e; e^ and e^ for Finland
Alternatively, if we compute the education investment predicted by the
model when " = 1, e^; i.e. when the parent decides alone for the education
of the child, even for the highest taste for his child,  = 1, the correlation be-
tween e and e^ is 0.56. e^ is in most cases under e (the mean of the di¤erence
of the two series is 0.05 with a standard deviation of 0.01).
Figure 2 presents e, e, and e for Finland for cohorts born between 1940
and 1980. The former model overestimates the education investment, while the
latter model underestimates it. Neither e^ nor e^ can t the evolution of e:
Hence neither a model where education is decided by the child alone, nor a
model where education is decided by the parent alone, enables us to rationalize
the observed data.
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Country Year  e e^ e^
Australia 1940 0.67 0.46 0.63 0.40
Australia 1950 0.78 0.48 0.64 0.44
Australia 1960 0.83 0.49 0.65 0.45
Australia 1970 0.86 0.49 0.65 0.46
Australia 1980 0.98 0.51 0.66 0.49
Austria 1940 0.41 0.41 0.58 0.29
Austria 1950 0.63 0.45 0.62 0.39
Austria 1960 0.75 0.46 0.64 0.43
Austria 1970 0.81 0.48 0.64 0.45
Austria 1980 0.91 0.48 0.66 0.48
Belgium 1940 0.47 0.36 0.60 0.32
Belgium 1950 0.70 0.42 0.63 0.41
Belgium 1960 0.81 0.45 0.64 0.45
Belgium 1970 0.85 0.48 0.65 0.46
Belgium 1980 0.93 0.51 0.66 0.48
Canada 1940 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.36
Canada 1950 0.76 0.51 0.64 0.43
Canada 1960 0.84 0.53 0.65 0.46
Canada 1970 0.90 0.55 0.66 0.47
Canada 1980 0.99 0.55 0.67 0.50
Denmark 1940 0.62 0.46 0.62 0.38
Denmark 1950 0.84 0.49 0.65 0.46
Denmark 1960 0.89 0.50 0.65 0.47
Denmark 1970 0.93 0.50 0.66 0.48
Denmark 1980 0.97 0.51 0.66 0.49
Country Year  e e^ e^
Finland 1940 0.29 0.37 0.56 0.23
Finland 1950 0.65 0.44 0.62 0.39
Finland 1960 0.74 0.49 0.64 0.43
Finland 1970 0.81 0.52 0.64 0.45
Finland 1980 0.93 0.52 0.66 0.48
France 1940 0.40 0.32 0.58 0.29
France 1950 0.66 0.39 0.62 0.40
France 1960 0.82 0.43 0.65 0.45
France 1970 0.88 0.47 0.65 0.47
France 1980 0.97 0.50 0.66 0.49
Germany 1940 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.35
Germany 1950 0.70 0.53 0.63 0.41
Germany 1960 0.78 0.54 0.64 0.44
Germany 1970 0.82 0.54 0.65 0.45
Germany 1980 0.91 0.53 0.66 0.48
Ireland 1940 0.39 0.33 0.58 0.28
Ireland 1950 0.68 0.36 0.63 0.40
Ireland 1960 0.79 0.41 0.64 0.44
Ireland 1970 0.84 0.43 0.65 0.46
Ireland 1980 0.91 0.46 0.66 0.48
Italy 1940 0.39 0.29 0.57 0.26
Italy 1950 0.64 0.36 0.62 0.39
Italy 1960 0.79 0.44 0.64 0.44
Italy 1970 0.88 0.46 0.65 0.47
Italy 1980 0.96 0.48 0.66 0.49
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Country Year  e e^ e^
Japan 1940 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00
Japan 1950 0.56 0.49 0.61 0.36
Japan 1960 0.71 0.53 0.63 0.41
Japan 1970 0.88 0.54 0.65 0.47
Japan 1980 1.00 0.54 0.67 0.50
Netherlands 1940 0.70 0.41 0.63 0.41
Netherlands 1950 0.88 0.45 0.65 0.47
Netherlands 1960 0.93 0.47 0.66 0.48
Netherlands 1970 0.94 0.48 0.66 0.48
Netherlands 1980 1.00 0.49 0.67 0.50
New Zealand 1940 0.71 0.43 0.63 0.41
New Zealand 1950 0.78 0.47 0.64 0.44
New Zealand 1960 0.84 0.50 0.65 0.46
New Zealand 1970 0.86 0.51 0.65 0.46
New Zealand 1980 0.93 0.52 0.66 0.48
Norway 1940 0.69 0.46 0.63 0.41
Norway 1950 0.91 0.49 0.66 0.48
Norway 1960 0.94 0.51 0.66 0.48
Norway 1970 0.97 0.52 0.66 0.49
Norway 1980 1.00 0.53 0.67 0.50
Country Year  e e^ e^
Sweden 1940 0.67 0.40 0.63 0.40
Sweden 1950 0.87 0.45 0.65 0.47
Sweden 1960 0.93 0.49 0.66 0.48
Sweden 1970 0.98 0.50 0.66 0.49
Sweden 1980 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.50
U.K. 1940 0.60 0.51 0.62 0.38
U.K. 1950 0.77 0.52 0.64 0.43
U.K. 1960 0.83 0.54 0.65 0.45
U.K. 1970 0.87 0.54 0.65 0.46
U.K. 1980 0.95 0.55 0.66 0.49
U.S.A. 1940 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.36
U.S.A. 1950 0.76 0.52 0.64 0.43
U.S.A. 1960 0.79 0.53 0.64 0.44
U.S.A. 1970 0.83 0.53 0.65 0.45
U.S.A. 1980 0.95 0.53 0.66 0.49
Introduction of " and  Let us now try to calibrate " and  for each
country, in such a way as to t the data. The introduction of 2 degrees of
freedom enables us indeed to match the data in most cases.21 The following
table presents pairs of parameters values:  is xed, and " varies from 1940 to
1980 for each country. "^ corresponds to the level of " that would t the data
for the chosen level of , and for the actual levels of  and e.
What is surprising in these gures is that we would have expected a decreas-
ing " for most countries, and in particular for countries and periods for which
we observe a convexity. Yet, it is not always what we observe. In many cases,
"^ is increasing. In particular, for high levels of , "^ is not decreasing in Italy
between 1940 and 1960 and for low levels of , "^ is not decreasing in the United
Kingdom between 1940 and 1970, while the relationship between education and
life expectancy in these countries displays convexity during these periods.
21 In some few cases, we can not nd an " under 1 that would t the data for  = 1:
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Country Year  e b"1 b"0:8 b"0:6 b"0:4 b"0:2 b"0
Australia 1940 0.67 0.46 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.59 0.54 0.49
Australia 1950 0.78 0.48 0.87 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.49
Australia 1960 0.83 0.49 0.86 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.47
Australia 1970 0.86 0.49 0.89 0.76 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.48
Australia 1980 0.98 0.51 0.94 0.79 0.68 0.60 0.53 0.48
Austria 1940 0.41 0.41 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.51
Austria 1950 0.63 0.45 0.82 0.73 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.50
Austria 1960 0.75 0.46 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.51
Austria 1970 0.81 0.48 0.88 0.76 0.67 0.59 0.54 0.49
Austria 1980 0.91 0.48 0.98 0.83 0.72 0.64 0.57 0.51
Belgium 1940 0.47 0.36 0.90 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.61
Belgium 1950 0.70 0.42 0.98 0.86 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58
Belgium 1960 0.81 0.45 0.99 0.85 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.55
Belgium 1970 0.85 0.48 0.92 0.78 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.50
Belgium 1980 0.93 0.51 0.91 0.77 0.66 0.58 0.52 0.47
Canada 1940 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.39
Canada 1950 0.76 0.51 0.71 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.44 0.40
Canada 1960 0.84 0.53 0.71 0.61 0.53 0.47 0.43 0.39
Canada 1970 0.90 0.55 0.70 0.59 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.37
Canada 1980 0.99 0.55 0.79 0.66 0.56 0.49 0.44 0.40
Denmark 1940 0.62 0.46 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.51 0.47
Denmark 1950 0.84 0.49 0.87 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.47
Denmark 1960 0.89 0.50 0.88 0.75 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.47
Denmark 1970 0.93 0.50 0.91 0.77 0.67 0.59 0.52 0.47
Denmark 1980 0.97 0.51 0.94 0.79 0.68 0.59 0.53 0.48
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Country Year  e b"1 b"0:8 b"0:6 b"0:4 b"0:2 b"0
Finland 1940 0.29 0.37 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.54
Finland 1950 0.65 0.44 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.57 0.52
Finland 1960 0.74 0.49 0.78 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.45
Finland 1970 0.81 0.52 0.73 0.63 0.55 0.49 0.44 0.40
Finland 1980 0.93 0.52 0.84 0.71 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.44
France 1940 0.40 0.32 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.66
France 1950 0.66 0.39 n.a.22 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.61
France 1960 0.82 0.43 n.a. 0.91 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.58
France 1970 0.88 0.47 0.98 0.83 0.72 0.64 0.57 0.52
France 1980 0.97 0.50 0.97 0.81 0.70 0.61 0.54 0.49
Germany 1940 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.34
Germany 1950 0.70 0.53 0.58 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.34
Germany 1960 0.78 0.54 0.62 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35
Germany 1970 0.82 0.54 0.64 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35
Germany 1980 0.91 0.53 0.80 0.67 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.42
Ireland 1940 0.39 0.33 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.65
Ireland 1950 0.68 0.36 n.a. 0.98 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.66
Ireland 1960 0.79 0.41 n.a. 0.95 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.61
Ireland 1970 0.84 0.43 n.a. 0.92 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.58
Ireland 1980 0.91 0.46 n.a. 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.55
Italy 1940 0.35 0.29 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.69
Italy 1950 0.64 0.36 n.a. 0.95 0.85 0.77 0.71 0.65
Italy 1960 0.79 0.44 n.a. 0.87 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.56
Italy 1970 0.88 0.46 n.a. 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55
Italy 1980 0.96 0.48 n.a. 0.87 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.53
22n.a. : non available. It is impossible to nd an " under 1 that would t the data for
 = 1:
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Country Year  e b"1 b"0:8 b"0:6 b"0:4 b"0:2 b"0
Japan 1940 0.00 0.45 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Japan 1950 0.56 0.49 0.59 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38
Japan 1960 0.771 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.33
Japan 1970 0.88 0.54 0.68 0.58 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.36
Japan 1980 1.00 0.54 0.81 0.68 0.58 0.51 0.45 0.41
Netherlands 1940 0.70 0.41 n.a. 0.88 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.59
Netherlands 1950 0.88 0.45 n.a. 0.91 0.79 0.70 0.63 0.57
Netherlands 1960 0.93 0.47 n.a. 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55
Netherlands 1970 0.94 0.48 n.a. 0.86 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.52
Netherlands 1980 1.00 0.49 n.a. 0.87 0.75 0.66 0.58 0.52
New Zealand 1940 0.71 0.43 0.96 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.62 0.56
New Zealand 1950 0.78 0.47 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.50
New Zealand 1960 0.84 0.50 0.82 0.70 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.44
New Zealand 1970 0.86 0.51 0.82 0.70 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.44
New Zealand 1980 0.93 0.52 0.85 0.72 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.44
Norway 1940 0.69 0.46 0.84 0.74 0.66 0.60 0.54 0.50
Norway 1950 0.91 0.49 0.95 0.81 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.50
Norway 1960 0.94 0.51 0.91 0.77 0.66 0.58 0.52 0.47
Norway 1970 0.97 0.52 0.89 0.75 0.64 0.56 0.50 0.45
Norway 1980 1.00 0.53 0.89 0.74 0.64 0.50 0.50 0.45
Sweden 1940 0.67 0.40 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.71 0.65 0.60
Sweden 1950 0.87 0.45 n.a. 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55
Sweden 1960 0.93 0.49 0.98 0.82 0.71 0.63 0.56 0.51
Sweden 1970 0.98 0.50 1.00 0.83 0.72 0.63 0.56 0.50
Sweden 1980 1.00 0.50 n.a. 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.56 0.50
Country Year  e b"1 b"0:8 b"0:6 b"0:4 b"0:2 b"0
U.K. 1940 0.60 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.36
U.K. 1950 0.77 0.52 0.70 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.40
U.K. 1960 0.83 0.54 0.68 0.58 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.37
U.K. 1970 0.87 0.54 0.67 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.36
U.K. 1980 0.95 0.55 0.73 0.62 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.38
U.S.A. 1940 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.37
U.S.A. 1950 0.76 0.52 0.66 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.38
U.S.A. 1960 0.79 0.53 0.67 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.38
U.S.A. 1970 0.83 0.53 0.72 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.39
U.S.A. 1980 1.95 0.53 0.83 0.70 0.60 0.53 0.47 0.43
The following table sums up the major trends of the evolutions of our cali-
brated " for the di¤erent countries in the database23 :
23We have looked at the variation of c" for each value of  and for each country in the
database and divided these countries in two groups: one for which c" is increasing or non
monotonous depending on the value of  and one for whichc" is decreasing or non monotonous
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b" increasing or non monotonous b" decreasing or non monotonous
parental authority reinforced childrens emancipation
Australia Belgium
Austria Finland
Canada France
Denmark Ireland
Germany Italy
Japan Netherlands
United Kingdom New Zealand
United States Norway
Sweden
According to this table, the revealed relation between intergenerational bar-
gaining power and the accumulation of human capital varies across countries.
In some countries, mostly Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan (left column), the
parent seems to gain power with the accumulation of human capital, whereas in
other countries, mostly France and Northern Europe (right column), the child
seems to become more powerful when human capital accumulates.
Since our computations entail obvious identication issues, b" does not cap-
ture only the variation of the distribution of bargaining power within the family,
but also omitted determinants of education. However, we have shown that nei-
ther the simple Ben-Porath model in which " = 0, nor the parental model with
" = 1, can fully rationalize the observed education and life expectancy pat-
terns, whereas our simple model, in which education is the outcome of family
bargaining, with distribution of bargaining power varying when human capital
accumulates, can do the job.
6 Conclusions
Demography and human capital accumulation are key factors for the under-
standing of long-run economic dynamics. According to Ben-Porath (1967), the
longer the expected lifetime is, the higher the returns on education investment
are. The demand for education is, ceteris paribus, increasing in life expectancy,
which is thus likely to foster human capital accumulation and growth.
In this paper, we proposed to enhance the Ben-Porath model by develop-
ing a three-period OLG model with endogenous mortality, where the education
investment results from a bargaining within the family. We rst introduced
the bargaining power as an exogenous parameter, and, then, proposed an ex-
tension where the bargaining power is a monotonic function of human capital
accumulation.
The introduction of an intrafamily bargaining on education renes the time-
horizon e¤ect pointed out by Ben-Porath: both the life expectancy of parents
and the life expectancy of children determine here the education level resulting
depending on the value of : Note that there is no country for which c" is alternatively
increasing and decreasing when  varies.
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from the bargaining. On the contrary, in the standard Ben-Porath, the life
expectancy of children is the only demographic determinant of their demand
for education. The intrafamily distribution of bargaining power matters thus
for human capital accumulation: if parents are more powerful ceteris paribus,
the demand for education is, in the absence of childrens myopia, lower, since
their remaining time horizon is shorter than their childrens. Thus, when the
child is fully rational, the distribution of bargaining power matters for long-
run dynamics: the more powerful the child is, the higher the likelihood for an
economy to experience perpetual growth. On the contrary, when the child does
not fully perceive the gains from education, that e¤ect may be inverted, and a
more powerful child may reduce the growth potential of the economy.
We proposed a qualitative empirical test of our model for 17 OECD countries
(1940-1980). While both models where the child decides alone on his education
or when the parent decides alone for his childs education are incompatible with
the data - the predicted education is much too low to t the data in the latter
case, and too high in the former case -, the introduction of a collective inter-
generational decision on education enables us to better replicate the observed
education and life expectancy patterns.
Yet, our model is simple, and opens several directions for future research,
taking into account, among other things, the choice of fertility, or the existence
of intracohort heterogeneity in lifestyles.24 Those extensions of our framework
would further enrich our study of the determinants of education demand. Note,
however, that the heterogeneity in life horizons between parents and children
would still be at work in such extended models. Hence our requalication of the
Ben-Porath e¤ect would remain relevant in those extended models.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The transition function is:
ht+1 = A

"(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))

ht  G(ht)
Note rst that, given A > 0, we have G(ht) > 0. We can also see that
G(0) = 0.
Note that G(ht)ht is increasing in ht as it is increasing in  and 
0(ht) > 0:
Moreover, we have, under limht!+1 (ht) =  < 1 :
limht!1
G(ht)
ht
= A

" + (1  ")(1 + )
1 + " + (1  ")(1 + )

7 1
The derivative G0(ht) is:
G0(ht) = A

"(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))

+Aht
["0(ht) + (1  ")0(ht)]
[1 + "(ht) + (1  ")(1 + (ht))]2
so that G0(ht) > 0:
Note that, under limht!0 (ht) = e > 0, 0 < limht!0 0(ht) <1; we have:
lim
ht!0
G0(ht) = A

"e + (1  ")(1 + e)
1 + "e + (1  ")(1 + e)

7 1
In proposition 3, in case 1, G(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood
of 0 (as G(0) = 0 and limht!0G
0(ht) < 1), and remains below the 45 line when
ht tends to innity (as limht!1
G(ht)
ht
< 1). Thus, given that G is continuous,
G0(ht) > 0 and that
G(ht)
ht
is increasing in ht; G(ht) always remain below the
45 line, so that no positive steady-state exists.
In case 2, G(ht) is also below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as
G(0) = 0 and limht!0G
0(ht) < 1), but lies above the 45 line when ht tends
to innity (as limht!1
G(ht)
ht
> 1). As a consequence, given the continuity of
G(ht); it must be the case that G(ht) crosses the 45 line at least once at a
positive h = h: As G(ht)ht is increasing in ht; h
 is the unique positive steady-
state equilibrium.
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In case 3, G(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as G(0) = 0
and limht!0G
0(ht) > 1), and remains above the 45 line when ht tends to
innity (as limht!1
G(ht)
ht
> 1). Thus, given that G is continuous, G0(ht) > 0
and that G(ht)ht is increasing in ht; G(ht) always remain above the 45
 line so
that no positive steady-state exists: the economy exhibits eternal growth.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Perpetual growth is possible when A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1 and sure when
A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

> 1: Let us use the following notations: H1("; ) =
"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+) andH2("; ) =
"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e) : As bothH1 andH2 are de-
creasing in ", the higher ", the lower the probability thatA

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

>
1 and A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

> 1:
As @H1(";)@ > 0 and
@H2(";)
@ > 0, but also
@H1(";)
@@" > 0 and
@H2(";)
@@" > 0,
an increase in  increases the probability of perpetual growth and the higher ",
the higher this e¤ect.
For the polar case " = 1 and  = 0, A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

= 0 and
A

"e+(1 ")(1+e)
1+"e+(1 ")(1+e)

= 0. The economy is trapped in poverty.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The transition function is:
ht+1 = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

ht  H(ht)
Note rst that, given A > 0, we have H(ht) > 0. We can also see that
H(0) = 0.
The derivative of H(ht)ht is:
"0(ht) [(ht)    (ht)] + 0(ht) ["(ht) +   "(ht)]
[1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))]2
7 0
since "0(ht) < 0 but  7 (1+(ht))(ht) :
Moreover, we have, under limht!+1 (ht) =  < 1 and limht!1 "(ht) = " :
limht!1
H(ht)
ht
= A

" + (1  ")(1 + )
1 + " + (1  ")(1 + )

7 1
The derivative H 0(ht) is:
H 0(ht) = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

+Aht
"0(ht) [(ht)    (ht)] + 0(ht) ["(ht) +   "(ht)]
[1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))]2
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Hence J 0(ht) 7 0, so that the transition function can cross the 45 line more
than once.
Note that, under limht!0 (ht) = e > 0, 0 < limht!0 0(ht) < 1; and
"(0) = 0, we have:
lim
ht!0
H 0(ht) = A
 e"e + (1  e")(1 + e)
1 + e"e + (1  e")(1 + e)

7 1
Hence we have the following 4 cases:
In case 1, H(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as H(0) = 0
and limht!0H
0(ht) = A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1), but lies above the 45 line
when ht tends to innity (as limht!1
H(ht)
ht
= A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1).
Thus the transition function crosses the 45 line at least once, but can cross it
more than once sinceH is non monotonic. Since it begins from below the 45 line
and ends above, it crosses the 45 line an odd number of times. If H(ht) crosses
the 45 line from above at a certain point h, if jH 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable
equilibrium. Moreover, H(ht) crosses the 45 line from below at least once, so
that the rst positive equilibrium is unstable. Hence 0 is a stable equilibrium
and there exists therefore a poverty trap. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1
there exists a zone of perpetual growth.
In case 2, H(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as H(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1), but lies below the 45 line when ht tends to
innity (asA

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function crosses the
45 line at least once, but can cross it more than once since H is non monotonic.
Since it begins from above the 45 line and ends below, it crosses the 45 line an
odd number of times. If H(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point
h, if jH 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. 0 is an unstable equilibrium,
and there may exist no stable equilibrium. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1
there exists no zone of perpetual growth.
In case 3, H(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as H(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1), and still lies below the 45 line when ht tends
to innity (as A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function may
never cross the 45 line, but can cross it an even number of times since J is non
monotonic. If H(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point h, if
jH 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. Moreover, 0 is a stable equilibrium
and there exists therefore a poverty trap. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

there
exists no zone of perpetual growth.
In case 4, H(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as H(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1), and still lies above the 45 line when ht tends
to innity (as A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function may
never cross the 45 line, but can cross it an even number of times since J is non
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monotonic. If H(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point h, if
jH 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. 0 is an unstable equilibrium and
there may exist no stable equilibrium. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1 there
exists a zone of perpetual growth.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The transition function is:
ht+1 = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

ht  J(ht)
Note rst that, given A > 0, we have J(ht) > 0. We can also see that
J(0) = 0.
The derivative of J(ht)ht is:
"0(ht) [(ht)    (ht)] + 0(ht) ["(ht) +   "(ht)]
[1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))]2
7 0
Moreover, we have, under limht!+1 (ht) =  < 1 and limht!1 "(ht) = " :
limht!1
J(ht)
ht
= A

" + (1  ")(1 + )
1 + " + (1  ")(1 + )

7 1
The derivative J 0(ht) is:
J 0(ht) = A

"(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))
1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))

+Aht
"0(ht) [(ht)    (ht)] + 0(ht) ["(ht) +   "(ht)]
[1 + "(ht)(ht) + (1  "(ht))(1 + (ht))]2
so that J 0(ht) 7 0. Hence the transition function can cross the 45 line more
than once.
Note that, under limht!0 (ht) = e > 0, 0 < limht!0 0(ht) < 1; and
"(0) = 0, we have:
lim
ht!0
J 0(ht) = A
 e"e + (1  e")(1 + e)
1 + e"e + (1  e")(1 + e)

7 1
Hence we have the following 4 cases, similar to proposition 4:
In case 1, J(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as J(0) = 0
and limht!0 J
0(ht) = A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1), but lies above the 45 line
when ht tends to innity (as limht!1
J(ht)
ht
= A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1).
Thus the transition function crosses the 45 line at least once, but can cross it
more than once since J is non monotonic. Since it begins from below the 45 line
and ends above, it crosses the 45 line an odd number of times. If J(ht) crosses
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the 45 line from above at a certain point h, if jJ 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable
equilibrium. Moreover, J(ht) crosses the 45 line from below at least once, so
that the rst positive equilibrium is unstable. Hence 0 is a stable equilibrium
and there exists therefore a poverty trap. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1 there
exists a zone of perpetual growth.
In case 2, J(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as J(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1), but lies below the 45 line when ht tends to
innity (asA

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function crosses the
45 line at least once, but can cross it more than once since J is non monotonic.
Since it begins from above the 45 line and ends below, it crosses the 45 line an
odd number of times. If J(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point
h, if jJ 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. 0 is an unstable equilibrium,
and there may exist no stable equilibrium. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1
there exists no zone of perpetual growth.
In case 3, J(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as J(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

< 1), and still lies below the 45 line when ht tends
to innity (as A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function may
never cross the 45 line, but can cross it an even number of times since J is
non monotonic. If J(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point h, if
jJ 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. Moreover, 0 is a stable equilibrium
and there exists therefore a poverty trap. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

there
exists no zone of perpetual growth.
In case 4, J(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as J(0) = 0
and A
 e"e+(1 e")(1+e)
1+e"e+(1 e")(1+e)

> 1), and still lies above the 45 line when ht tends
to innity (as A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

< 1). Thus the transition function may
never cross the 45 line, but can cross it an even number of times since J is
non monotonic. If J(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at a certain point h,
if jJ 0(ht)j < 1, than h is a stable equilibrium. 0 is an unstable equilibrium and
there may exist no stable equilibrium. Since A

"+(1 ")(1+)
1+"+(1 ")(1+)

> 1 there
exists a zone of perpetual growth.
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